

RUMOREM VERITATIS

On the Possible Material Efficacy of Common Belief

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I

We propose for examination that an accepted representation may sometimes help to determine the form of a physical alteration through a connexion not exhausted by the ordinary physiological and behavioural effects of belief and their physical consequences. On this supposition, a body or a wall would change, and some of its changed particulars would depend upon what had been believed. The proposal concerns the production of an observable alteration, rather than observers being induced to misperceive an unchanged object.

The altered object could furnish evidence to a witness who had never heard the originating belief. He might describe its condition accurately and reject the believers' account of its cause. We shall argue that his independence in observation would not establish independence from their belief in the production of what he observed. If the accepted content helped to specify the alteration, the resulting agreement between belief and object could itself be an effect of acceptance. A false account might thereby acquire a physical accompaniment without becoming a true account of the object's earlier history.

Merton has shown how a mistaken definition of a situation can prompt conduct which produces circumstances subsequently taken to vindicate it.[1, pp. 194-196] The general difficulty about the production of evidence is already present in his argument. Our conjecture extends the possible causal route beyond conduct and ordinary physiology, into alterations of living tissue or external matter. Merton expressly distinguishes the social process he describes from the course of nature. His argument gives no evidence for this extension. Its relevance is that accurate observation of a consequence need not vindicate the belief which helped to bring that consequence about.

Interpreted as direct mental action upon an external object, the proposal would depart from Broad's principle limiting direct mental action to changes in the agent's own brain. An unfamiliar physical intermediary might instead preserve that restriction. Broad considers alternatives of this kind and places psychokinetic claims among the less firmly established results of psychical research.[2] We leave the means of transmission open. Choosing a means before establishing a dependence would conceal one conjecture beneath another.

The material hypothesis and its consequence for evidence have different burdens. That accepted content has such efficacy on some occasions is a conjecture about

nature. That an actual contribution would have to be included in judging the resulting evidence is a claim about inference. The second can be defended conditionally without having established the first. Nor does an imaginable cause automatically weaken evidence in a particular episode. An account of its relevance there must show more than its logical possibility.

For theology the question concerns the passage from an unusual occurrence to a sign bearing authority. A manifestation might be physical, accurately witnessed, and responsive to religious expectation, while its origin remained in dispute. We wish to consider how acceptance of an interpretation could enter the history of the occurrence subsequently offered in its support. The Harrowgate account of 1921 and the St. Mary's Abbey record of 1347 place different demands upon this conjecture: one concerns a living person whose awareness is unknown, the other masonry which cannot itself believe. Their incomplete records will constrain the proposal; they cannot establish its causal premise.

II

A mental contribution to an alteration might initiate a process, affect its direction, or maintain its result. These functions need not go together. An apprehension could initiate a disturbance whose form was determined by the object's physical condition. Conversely, it might affect a process already begun through ordinary causes. Once an alteration existed, physical dispositions might suffice for its continuance.

Any actual contribution could raise a question about independence in production. Our stronger proposal concerns the determination of form: some difference in what was accepted would make a difference to what physically occurred. If belief merely initiated an indiscriminate disturbance, the resemblance of the result to the belief would still require a separate explanation. In the account proposed here, represented particulars would help explain that resemblance. This commits us to more than finding that apprehension preceded an unusual event.

We favour a restricted supposition in which belief affects the course of an existing physical process. The object would supply much of the alteration's realisation. Persons who anticipate changes of hair, voice, or carriage need not possess a description of the bodily organisation capable of producing them; people who anticipate a stain need not know its composition. The conjecture assigns represented outward particulars a selective part without requiring the mind to prescribe every intervening physical detail. A complete embodiment of a story would demand much more, and is unnecessary to the argument.

This restriction has a cost. There must be some relation between the represented particular and the physical changes available in the object. Saying that belief selects a result names the dependence to be investigated; it does not explain how selection occurs. A theory would have to say which features can enter this relation and how the object limits their realisation. Without such limits, every incomplete resemblance could be excused as a concession to matter and every complete resemblance praised as mental efficacy. The restricted conjecture would then explain no more than an unrestricted one.

Acceptance also has a proposed causal part. A man may entertain a proposition, deny it, fear its possibility, or accept it as fact. A sufficiently similar content can be present under each attitude. We suppose that assent contributes to the efficacy, while the content helps specify the alteration. A vivid image need not be believed, and belief need not include much imagery. The hypothesis would lose this distinguishing claim if equally precise but disbelieved representations proved equally operative under comparable conditions.

This gives an alternative account a definite place. Imagery might have efficacy while assent merely accompanied it. The two records cannot discriminate these proposals. We select belief because the alleged disturbances occur in settings of shared judgement, but this is a reason for posing the question there, not evidence that assent is the operative circumstance. The choice remains answerable to a comparison between differing attitudes towards sufficiently similar contents.

"Common" describes that setting before it describes a cause. Communication can spread a representation and renew its consideration. It does not establish that several contributors are necessary, that their contributions add together, or that a community has a mind of its own. One person's efficacy and several concurrent contributions remain different possibilities. A shared name may conceal disagreement about every visible feature attributed to its object. Neither numbers nor agreement can be treated as a measure of force without further evidence.

Physical persistence permits a more definite economy. Price proposes that images may originate in minds and subsequently persist apart from them; his application to haunting excludes physical effects.[3, pp. 318–320, 324–326, 341] Matthews questions in what sense images or feelings without an experiencing consciousness remain psychical, while finding personal survival more intelligible.[4, pp. 13–15] Our proposal need not retain an ownerless psychical image. If belief contributed to an alteration of masonry, the masonry could afterwards endure by physical means. An organism could continue through its own living processes. Persistence would belong to the altered thing, without requiring continued acceptance.

The resulting account has a discernible shape: assent contributes to an influence, represented particulars help direct an alteration, and the object supplies both much of its realisation and the means of its later continuance. This is the candidate we prefer to examine before adding complete material embodiment or constant mental maintenance. Its comparative economy gives it a purpose as a conjecture, not a presumption of truth. Ordinary mental action already shows that a cause need not contain a description of every physical detail in its effect; it provides no warrant for extending that action beyond its familiar connexions.

III

The available Harrowgate account places descriptions circulating among residents and tentative newspaper reports of a beast before reports of changes in a hunter. These concern increased bodily hair, an altered voice, and a change of posture or carriage. A report of his disappearance closes the account. This is the order in which the material presents the episode, not a chronology of bodily changes independently established by the authors.

An alteration may begin before anyone reports it. Early signs might occasion a story, although fuller descriptions of the person's condition appear later. Retelling may also transfer a detail backwards, making an expectation seem more precise than it was. Neither possibility requires deliberate falsehood. The difference between the first report of a change and its actual commencement is especially important when a gradual bodily process is alleged.

The resemblance leaves a further gap. A story about a beast in the neighbourhood is not yet a belief identifying this hunter as that beast. Nor does the general designation secure advance agreement about hair, voice, or posture. If the earlier representation concerned him, its relevant particulars would need to be established before their alleged effects. If instead a representation about a beast could affect a person whom it did not identify, an account would be needed of the connexion selecting him as its material recipient. The available record establishes neither relation. A later decision that he fits the tale could arise from observing him; it cannot be carried backwards into the tale's supposed causal action.

The reported features also demand different examinations. Voice and carriage are commonly judged against remembered habits, and expectation may affect the comparison. Hair growth is more directly inspectable, but its report still depends upon opportunities for comparison. Their conjunction could be significant if the changes and their order were separately established. In the present account we have to ask whether the resemblance developed in the body, in the descriptions, or in both. We do not have evidence of a completed, independently functioning animal anatomy.

Suppose, nevertheless, that some physical alteration of the reported kind occurred and depended upon antecedent beliefs held by others. The hunter need not have recognised it at its commencement. A gradual change could precede his apprehension, and its eventual conspicuousness could compel recognition without his having expected it. Under this supposition his recognition would be an effect, not an indispensable initiating condition. The distinction matters because an explanation through his willing imitation would require a different psychological history.

Nothing permits us to assign that history to him. There is no first-person testimony from the hunter in the material available to us. His assent, fear, resistance, or ignorance cannot be filled in to complete a causal scheme. Even established unawareness would exclude only those explanations requiring his awareness at that time. It would not establish a collective cause, exclude an unknown individual contributor, or remove ordinary physical causes.

His disappearance tempts the reader to complete a bodily history which the account leaves unfinished. Yet the disappearance provides no anatomical information. There is

no subsequent condition for us to inspect and no final fate to assign. The case's bearing upon our hypothesis therefore remains attached to the limited changes reported before he vanished.

IV

The St. Mary's Abbey record for 1347 reports voices, cold, and shadows alongside doubts concerning the consecration of the ground. It also describes recurrent cracks in the eastern chapel wall, repeated applications of plaster, and a reddish seepage. A later visitation by cathedral representatives found no liquid. The conjunction gives the episode its religious character, but the several reports concern different sorts of evidence.

A voice or a shadow may be recorded as an experience without leaving an object for a later visitor to examine. Repeated plastering places the alleged cracks within a history of material work: the community treated the fabric as damaged and attempted to repair it. This does not identify what caused the damage. A defect which remained beneath the repair could account for recurrence through ordinary processes. Renewed cracking, by itself, does not show either renewed mental action or an effort by an agency to defeat the repairs.

The reported liquid must be considered separately. Redness is not a chemical identification. The record mentions no preserved sample from which the liquid's composition could be determined. The later absence of liquid does not decide whether an earlier transient seepage occurred. Nor can the earlier report decide what the visitors ought to have found. The two statements concern different occasions; accepting either does not oblige us to erase the other.

Doubt about consecration gives no definite prediction of cracking or red seepage. People accepting the same religious apprehension might expect quite different signs, or expect none. To make the recorded features an instance of content-dependent efficacy, one would need an antecedent representation specific enough to bear upon them. The record's association between anxiety and disturbance does not provide this. Otherwise the hypothesis could acquire apparent successes by treating every subsequent trouble as the manifestation of an initially indefinite fear.

The distinction between initiation and specification is particularly clear here. Were apprehension shown to contribute to a disturbance, that finding would still leave open why this wall cracked and why a liquid of the reported appearance emerged. Ordinary properties of the fabric could account for the form of an extraordinarily initiated change. Alternatively, represented particulars might have influenced its form. Only the second supposition would make the visible concordance itself a consequence of content-dependent efficacy.

Unlike the hunter, the wall cannot accept a description of itself. If the two cases were established as instances of the same extraordinary connexion, assent by the affected object or subject could not be an indispensable condition of that connexion. This would direct inquiry towards the human persons representing it, without deciding whether one or several supplied the effective contribution. A general account would also have to explain why the differing dispositions of living tissue and masonry admitted whatever restricted dependence was alleged.

Whether consecration occurred is a different question from whether plaster cracked afterwards. Fright, mistaken perception, ordinary damage, and a content-dependent alteration could also be intermingled in one episode. The hypothesis concerns a proposed connexion between specified beliefs and specified changes; it gives no reason to combine every experience in the record into a single physical effect.

V

Suppose that an accepted representation helped to determine the form of a physical alteration through the connexion proposed, and that the altered condition persisted long enough for an observer ignorant of the representation to inspect it. Suppose also that this contribution did not require the accepted account of the object's earlier history to be true. These premises allow the observer to encounter a physical condition answering to part of the representation, although the representation's historical account may have been false.

The observer can establish the present condition without relying upon the first believers' testimony. If he then offers its resemblance to their account as confirmation of that account's origin or authority, a further inference has entered. The resemblance may be among the consequences of acceptance which his observation independently establishes. To treat it as though acceptance had played no part would misdescribe the evidence's causal history. Independence from suggestion in seeing the result cannot supply independence from belief in making it.

Merton's discussion already identifies the retrospective validation of an initial error by circumstances which it helped to produce.[1, pp. 195–196] The proposed material extension matters when investigators have excluded conduct and are inclined to regard physical inspection as the end of the inquiry. Involuntary physiological effects and their downstream physical consequences would still require examination. Even after those ordinary connexions were excluded, the material hypothesis, if established as operative, would supply another route from accepted content to an inspectable condition.

Several unacquainted witnesses could strengthen the evidence that the condition existed. Their agreement could reduce the likelihood of an invention or an error peculiar to one observer. All would nevertheless examine the result of the same production. One might object that this is true whenever several witnesses observe one object. It is; the relevant question is which earlier circumstances entered that common cause. Repeated inspection can settle a condition more firmly without creating further occasions on which it arose independently of the belief whose authority is in question.

This does not make causal dependence equivalent to evidential worthlessness. An accurate belief could also contribute to an alteration. An earlier event might have occasioned the belief through reliable testimony, so that the later manifestation stood at the end of a history beginning with that event. Alternatively, belief and ordinary physical causes might contribute together, with particulars of the result bearing differently upon each account. To discover a contribution of belief would require those relations to be examined. It would not establish that the belief was false or that every feature of the result was equally explicable without its truth.

The sharper conclusion requires a comparison. If, after taking account of the causes relevant to the comparison, the observed concordance is equally to be expected whether a historical account is true or false, that concordance supplies no ground by itself for choosing between those accounts. A difference in their prior grounds, or a physical particular not explained by the supposed efficacy, could still bear upon the choice. The operative dependence must therefore be established and its explanatory reach delimited. Merely finding an additional cause does not perform this comparison.

In an Abbey-like supposition, damaged masonry would corroborate a report of damage and weaken the view that damage existed only in frightened descriptions. The character of the cracks might also bear upon ordinary physical causes. If accepted apprehensions were shown to have helped specify that character, their contribution would belong in assessing its agreement with the community's religious account. The finding would neither supply an independent repetition of the wall's history nor settle what other grounds the account possessed.

Time prevents one further confusion. A judgement that a man already possesses certain features on Monday remains mistaken if he acquires them on Friday. If Monday's acceptance helped produce Friday's features, the later applicability of the same description could explain an appearance of vindication without making Monday's present-tense judgement true. A prediction concerning Friday would be different. Its fulfilment could be genuine, although acceptance helped cause it, rather than the prediction arising from knowledge of an independently impending event.

An assertion about consecration concerns a past event which later damage cannot alter. If an erroneous account of that event contributed to a subsequent disturbance, the disturbance could be physical while the account remained erroneous. This follows from the stipulated history; it does not decide the Abbey's history. The hypothesis thus allows a false historical representation to acquire an observable accompaniment. It does not allow a subsequent accompaniment to remake the past.

Later acceptance could then rest on inspection where earlier acceptance had rested on rumour. A further cycle would require a further premise: these later beliefs must themselves contribute to fresh alterations. Persistence and ordinary physical development would not establish renewed efficacy. The altered condition could persist after the originating belief had ceased.

VI

The strongest objection is that the material conjecture can accommodate every outcome while explaining none. Convictions are abundant; corresponding alterations are not. Persons are persistently described in terms to which their bodies never conform, and communities share fears which acquire no physical counterpart. This counts against any simple sufficiency of assent or agreement. Once unknown conditions are added, however, a success can be credited to their presence and a failure excused by their absence. Unless those conditions can be described independently of the result, restricted efficacy has no advantage as an explanation.

Price faces a comparable rarity problem and proposes interference among persistent images, with differences in their charge and affinity.[3, pp. 337-341] Those con-

jectures belong to his account of haunting without physical effects. They do not explain alterations of tissue or masonry. We cannot borrow their names to fill our own gap. Exceptional intensity assigned to every success, or a susceptibility inferred only from the alteration it allegedly permits, would restate the selection of the cases rather than account for it.

The objection limits what we may claim now. The two records give no positive reason to estimate how often such efficacy occurs, or to prefer it to the ordinary alternatives in either episode. Its present value is a specified causal question and the conditional consequence developed above. To become a testable explanation, a narrower account would have to specify conditions whose presence or absence could be recognised independently of whether an alteration occurred. If success itself were the only mark of their presence, failures would never reach the account.

Such an account would also need to specify what counted against it. It might concern a stated kind of object, a stated range of represented changes, and independently recognisable circumstances of acceptance. Repeated absence of the expected dependence under those circumstances would bear against that account. One could retreat to a different, rarer efficacy, but that retreat would surrender the tested claim. It would not preserve its support. The bare assertion that some belief has an extraordinary effect somewhere is much harder to disprove, and for that reason offers much less to explain the cases before us.

The parts of the restricted proposal would require different comparisons. To examine the contribution of assent, sufficiently similar represented contents would have to be entertained under differing attitudes, while relevant physical and personal circumstances remained comparable. To examine specification by content, alterations would have to vary with represented particulars rather than merely with a general disturbance accompanying conviction. A prospective resemblance would improve upon retrospective matching, but it would not alone decide whether acceptance, imagery, or an ordinary cause supplied the effective difference.

The target presents a separate problem. A general expectation about a beast or a malign place does not by itself explain why this person or this wall would be affected. The represented subject and the material recipient need not be identical, but a proposed connexion must account for their relation without deriving it solely from the later resemblance. Conflicting expectations would put further pressure upon it. If different persons accepted incompatible particulars, the account would need a rule, supported apart from the selected result, for deciding whether shared elements or particular contributors mattered. Counting believers would not supply that rule.

Direction of dependence must then be examined. An unnoticed bodily change might occasion the expectation credited with producing it. A physical defect might both damage a wall and alarm its observers. Conduct prompted by conviction could alter an object through means omitted from the report. An antecedent description and a subsequent inspection would improve the record but leave these possibilities open. The inquiry would need a history of the object's condition and of the ordinary routes connecting the believers with it. There is no single precaution which converts their temporal order into proof of an extraordinary connexion.

Persistence tests a different claim again. Ceasing to attend is not ceasing to assent, and the disappearance of the first believers is not the absence of all relevant belief. Before persistence could count against a maintenance theory, the mental condition which that theory requires would have to be shown absent. The theory would also have to require it for the particular physical condition observed. Continued change would decide still less, since an earlier alteration could initiate an ordinary developing process. Our preference for physical continuance avoids a need for maintenance; it does not turn continuance into evidence for the initial influence.

An account of how the influence is transmitted is still missing. A false representation is an existing mental circumstance, whatever its failure to describe the world; its falsity does not in itself exclude causal action. Whether its content can affect physical processes beyond ordinary mediation is a further question. The distinctions above specify what such a dependence would involve and what would count against a proposed account of it.

VII

Matthews distinguishes two consequences of admitting analogues to events described as miraculous. Such analogues can make the reported events less antecedently incredible while weakening an argument which depended upon their uniqueness. He nevertheless retains their possible congruence with Christ's character and mission.[4, pp. 10–11] His theological judgement thus involves more than strangeness. The material conjecture introduces a further question: whether acceptance of an interpretation helped to produce the occurrence offered as its sign.

If such a contribution were established, physical concordance would have to be assessed in relation to it. The occurrence might attest an efficacy of human belief without, through that efficacy alone, attesting the truth of its religious content. Its expected form would also leave an attribution of intention unsettled. A frightening manifestation would not identify a demonic agent, nor a consoling manifestation a divine one, merely by answering expectation. The intention attributed to an agent requires grounds beyond the reproduction of that form.

Consider two incompatible doctrines and the whole body of manifestations offered in their support. Suppose that, in the light of the same independently established circumstances, those manifestations are equally to be expected whether the first doctrine is true or the second. Their concordance would then supply no ground by itself for preferring one doctrine to the other. Equal sincerity alone would not establish this equality. Differences in operative conditions could produce unequal results, while the doctrines might possess other, unequal evidence.

One might propose that only true religious beliefs possess the efficacy. Truth would then be an operative condition, so the equality assumed in the preceding comparison could no longer be taken for granted. A manifestation could support this proposal if the proposal accounted for it better than competing explanations. But to assume the doctrine true, interpret the manifestation as an effect of that truth, and then cite the manifestation to establish the doctrine would be circular.

Nor would discovery of a human contribution settle every question of divine agency. Providence may be held to employ created causes, including human minds. An efficacy of belief and a divine purpose could then belong to the same history. Their compatibility would not identify a special communication in a particular occurrence. Persons who agreed about the human contribution could disagree about that further interpretation, and grounds distinguishing their accounts would still be needed. Our conjecture concerns what the physical concordance establishes, while leaving this theological question open.

The distinction has a consequence for accusations against persons. Acquisition of an appearance would not establish a previous offence, nor would animal-like features determine whether memory, understanding, and personal continuity remained. At Harrowgate, the lack of the hunter's own testimony leaves those questions beyond the reported changes of hair, voice, and posture. We cannot replace the missing person with the character required by the circulating story. A disturbance at the Abbey would likewise leave an accusation about the place's earlier history dependent upon grounds concerning that history.

Our proposed efficacy would allow belief to alter a public object whose changed condition afterwards compelled recognition from persons who rejected the belief. If it occurred, inspection could establish the resulting condition while leaving the accepted account of its origin unjustified. A sign's physical reality would then be compatible with an error in the history told about it, and accurate witnesses could inherit the consequence of that error without inheriting the error itself.

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2. Broad, C. D. "The Relevance of Psychical Research to Philosophy." *Philosophy* 24, no. 91 (1949): 291-309. Especially "The Basic Limiting Principles," division (2), and "The Less Firmly Established Results and the Basic Principles," subsection (1).
3. Price, H. H. "Haunting and the 'Psychic Ether' Hypothesis." *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research* 45 (1939): 307-343. Especially pp. 318-320, 324-326, 337-341.
4. Matthews, W. R. "Psychical Research and Theology." *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research* 46 (1940): 1-15. Especially pp. 10-11 and 13-15.

Supplementary archival material

Rumorem Veritatis (1951)

The following newspaper extracts were added during later preparation of this digital file. They are separate from the 1951 paper and are not included in its original pagination.

Both concern the Harrowgate account discussed in Section III. Their inclusion here does not establish that the authors consulted these particular copies.

CONTENTS OF THE SUPPLEMENT

S1 *The Harrowgate Gazette*, 4 March 1921, p. 3.

"The Harrowgate Beast." Report of a figure near the moor.

S2 *The Harrowgate Gazette*, 15 April 1921, p. 8.

"Missing. Edward Trench." Notice requesting information about his whereabouts.

The retained crops include adjacent news and advertisements. Mastheads and issue dates fall outside the crops; issue details are supplied in the captions.

The notices record a reported sighting and a missing man. Neither establishes that the man and the reported figure were the same.

The Harrowgate Beast

The Harrowgate Gazette, 4 March 1921, p. 3.

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The Prime Minister maintained that German capacity to pay had not been exhausted. The warning leaves the German delegation a short interval in which to put forward a fresh offer.

PARISH ROOM SOCIAL.

There was a cheerful company at the parish room on Wednesday evening, despite the wet weather. Songs were followed by a short reading, and tea was served at the long tables before the chairs were cleared for games. A competition in guessing the weight of a cake occasioned much amusement, the winner generously cutting it for those who remained. The sum after expenses will be put towards new curtains for the room. Thanks were given to the ladies who supplied refreshments. A brown woollen scarf left upon a chair may be claimed from the caretaker.

A READER'S COMPLAINT.

Sir,
The stones now heaped against the wall in Mill Lane have driven foot passengers into the cart track. I do not question the necessity of the repairs, but must the whole length of the footway be obstructed before a yard of it is made good? On Tuesday I saw two children obliged to step into the gutter while a cart pased. There is room within the yard for the larger heap. A little attention to its removal would spare much inconvenience.

Yours faithfully,
A RATEPAYER.

DORRICK'S STATIONERY
Account Books, Writing Paper, Envelopes.
School Exercise Books and Slates.
Orders taken for newspapers and periodicals.

Thursday's market, and most of the baskets had been cleared before noon. There was less enquiry for potatoes than last week. Early arrivals obtained the better cabbages, several later lots having suffered in carriage. The crowd about the poultry pens made passage difficult for a time, until two empty hampers were removed. Stallholders have been reminded to keep the opening by the pump clear for barrows.

THE HARROWGATE BEAST.
STRANGE FIGURE NEAR THE MOOR.

The talk of a strange creature upon the moor has occupied a good many tongues in Harrowgate this week. Descriptions have grown considerably in the telling, though the two local men from whom particulars have been obtained give very different accounts of what they saw.

One, returning towards the town after dark on Tuesday, noticed a stooping figure beside the road where the bank rises steeply. He took it at first for a man seeking something upon the ground. When it moved away towards the heather, its bent carriage struck him as peculiar, but the light was too poor for him to distinguish its face. He would venture no opinion as to its size.

The second man is less disposed to make a marvel of the affair. He saw a dark shape on the lower edge of the moor on the following evening and thought it might have been a large sheep standing against the bank. A rough, hoarse cry reached him as he went by; whether it came from the shape or from farther across the moor he could not say.

In the shops the creature has already acquired a name, and accounts of its appearance differ from one counter to the next. The first man maintains that he saw a figure moving with a marked stoop. The other holds that the road and the dusk explain a good deal. Neither could give more than a rough indication of the spot when questioned.

CLOCKS STOPPED?
E. Norrill repairs clocks and watches

Newspaper extract. Adjacent items retained; masthead and date outside crop.

Missing: Edward Trench

The Harrowgate Gazette, 15 April 1921, p. 8.

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with the head teacher. The gate must
be fastened after use, as fowls have
already found their way inside.

MISSING EDWARD TRENCH

Last seen on Saturday, 9th April,
upon the upper moor road, wearing a
dark coat, corduroy trousers, and a
soft felt hat. Any person who has seen
him since that date, or who can give
information respecting his present
whereabouts, is requested to commu-
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Police Station. Persons able to supply
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GENERAL SERVANT

Newspaper extract. The notice makes no reference to the reported creature.